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Habeas Won and Lost: The Eleventh 
Circuit’s Narrow View of State Court 
Judgments 
CHRISTINA M. FROHOCK* 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated its panel opinion in Patter-
son v. Secretary and reheard the case en banc. The court’s 
new opinion revisits the prohibition against “second or suc-
cessive” habeas corpus petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and 
embraces the dissenting view in the prior opinion, rejecting 
the reasoning of the majority. A new state court judgment 
resets the habeas clock, allowing a prisoner to file an addi-
tional federal habeas petition without running afoul of sec-
tion 2244(b). Previously, the court offered an expansive view 
of such judgments, looking to whether the state court has 
substantively changed the prisoner’s sentence. The court 
now offers a narrow view, looking only to whether the state 
court has authorized the prisoner’s custody. This Article de-
scribes the majority and dissenting opinions in both itera-
tions of Patterson v. Secretary. The Article then identifies 
both textual and subtextual disputes among the judges, ar-
guing that the opinions are proxies for a deep division in 
criminal law between finality and justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It’s all about custody. Or it’s all about substance. Really, it de-
pends on whom you ask. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit recently reheard Patterson v. Secretary, and the case outcome 
flipped while the point of dispute between majority and dissent re-
mained the same.1 When Florida prisoner Ace Patterson first ap-
peared before the Eleventh Circuit with a habeas corpus challenge 
to his state court judgment, he won relief from a divided panel.2 
Judge William Pryor opened his dissent with a statement that Pat-
terson had “won the habeas lottery today.”3 His luck was fleeting. 
An order vacating the panel opinion and granting rehearing en banc 
forced Patterson to play the lottery again.4 This time, in front of the 
full bench, he lost.5 
In both Patterson I and Patterson II, the Eleventh Circuit con-
sidered what constitutes a new judgment in state court. The answer 
is critical, as a new state court judgment wipes the habeas slate clean 
and allows a petitioner to file multiple petitions or applications in 
federal court without violating the statutory prohibition on “second 
or successive” petitions.6 The point of contention between the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions remained the same. According to 
Judge Jordan—writing for the majority in Patterson I and dissenting 
                                                                                                             
 1 Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson I), 812 F.3d 885, 891–94 
(11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 836 F.3d 1358, 1358 
(11th Cir. 2016); Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 
1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); id. at 1332 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
 2 Patterson I, 812 F.3d at 886, 894. 
 3 Id. at 896 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 4 Patterson I, 836 F.3d at 1358. 
 5 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1321–22. 
 6 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012); see Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 341–
42 (2010); id. at 324 n.1 (noting that the Supreme Court uses “petition” and “ap-
plication” interchangeably in the habeas context). 
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in Patterson II—a substantive change in a prisoner’s sentence cre-
ates a new judgment, while any lesser change does not.7 According 
to Judge Pryor—dissenting in Patterson I and writing for the major-
ity in Patterson II—a change in sentence that authorizes custody of 
the prisoner creates a new judgment, while any other change does 
not.8 Neither the law nor the facts changed, and neither explains the 
reversal from one hearing to the next. The explanation lies in each 
judge’s preference for finality or justice. 
 
I. PATTERSON BACKGROUND 
The facts of Patterson are horrific. Originally from Michigan, 
Ace Robert Patterson was visiting North Florida on July 31, 1997, 
when he met the eight-year-old girl who would soon become his 
victim, and who was later named in court papers as only “K.H.” to 
protect her identity.9 Patterson was in town to see his distant cousin, 
and K.H. was her daughter.10 The adults enjoyed time together at a 
local establishment and in the cousin’s mobile home.11 After the 
children went to bed, the adults ate food and continued to socialize.12 
The evening wound down around 3:00 a.m., when K.H.’s mother 
drove Patterson to the residence where he was staying.13 He left—
but not for good. During the night, Patterson broke through the back 
door of his cousin’s home, took the young girl from her bed, and 
carried her into the woods.14 He raped her repeatedly and gagged 
her with his fingers.15 He then fled on foot.16 K.H. survived the at-
tack and found her way home. Crying, she knocked on her front door 
                                                                                                             
 7 See Patterson I, 812 F.3d at 891–92; Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1332 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting). 
 8 See Patterson I, 812 F.3d at 899 (Pryor, J., dissenting); Patterson II, 849 
F.3d at 1326. 
 9 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323; En Banc Brief of Appellant at ii, Patterson 
II, 849 F.3d 1321 (No. 12–12653–AA). 
 10 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323; see Order Granting Certificate of Appeala-
bility at 4, Patterson I, 836 F.3d 1358 (No. 12–12653–AA), ECF No. 39. 
 11 Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, supra note 10, at 4. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323; Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, 
supra note 10, at 4–5. 
 15 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323. 
 16 Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, supra note 10, at 5. 
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and woke her mother and her mother’s fiancé.17 They found the 
child covered with bruises, scratches, and dirt.18 Her mother called 
the police.19 
The Madison County Sheriff’s Office distributed WANTED 
posters around town, showing a ten-year-old photo of Patterson.20 
About a week after the assault, a waitress in a sandwich shop recog-
nized Patterson from the distinctive tattoo on his right arm, depicting 
a wizard with a crystal ball and stars.21 He had ordered a Coca-Cola, 
but quickly left the shop.22 The waitress followed him and called the 
authorities.23 Patterson was soon caught and arrested.24 
In 1998, a Florida jury convicted Patterson on all charges: bur-
glary with battery, aggravated kidnapping of a child, and two counts 
of capital sexual battery on a child under twelve years old.25 The 
circuit court sentenced him to 311 months in prison for burglary and 
aggravated kidnapping, and consecutive terms of life imprisonment 
and chemical castration for sexual battery.26 A Florida appellate 
court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences.27 
Patterson did not resign himself to these judicial defeats. He 
filed four habeas corpus petitions in state court directed to his con-
victions and sentences, three of which alleged that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.28 The Florida court indulged the 
repetitive filings, to a point. In 2001, denying the fourth petition, the 
                                                                                                             
 17 Id.; Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323. 
 18 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323. 
 19 Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, supra note 10, at 5. 
 20 Tattoo Leads to Arrest, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 8, 1997, at 2; Tattoo Helps 
Police Arrest Suspect in Girl’s Assault, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 1997, at D3. 
 21 Tattoo Leads to Arrest, supra note 20; Tattoo Helps Police Arrest Suspect 
in Girl’s Assault, supra note 20. 
 22 Tattoo Leads to Arrest, supra note 20. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Replacement 
Brief of Appellee at 1, Patterson I, 812 F.3d 885 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 836 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 12–12653–AA). 
 26 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323. 
 27 Id. at 1323; Patterson v. State, 736 So. 2d 1185, 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) 
(mem.). 
 28 See Patterson v. State, 788 So. 2d 397, 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (per cu-
riam). 
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First District Court of Appeal “admonished [Patterson] that the fil-
ing of any further successive and/or frivolous petitions or appeals 
may result in the imposition of sanctions.”29 In addition to targeting 
the perceived failings of his own counsel, he also lodged criticisms 
against opposing counsel. Patterson filed an ethics complaint against 
the trial prosecutor, which went nowhere.30 
Finding no relief in state court, Patterson shifted his attention to 
federal court for a collateral attack.31 In 2006, he filed a handwritten, 
pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.32 
Patterson claimed that his state court convictions had violated both 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.33 Still unhappy with 
his representation, Patterson also claimed that the convictions had 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel because “an effective and perceptive defense attorney” would 
have chosen different jurors.34 The district court for the Northern 
District of Florida dismissed the habeas petition as untimely under 
the one-year statute of limitations.35 
In 2009, Patterson changed strategy. More than a decade had 
passed since his crime. The victim became an adult. Patterson re-
mained incarcerated in the Hendry Correctional Institution in Im-
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. 
 30 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1323. 
 31 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting habeas petitions in fed-
eral court unless, among other exceptions, “the applicant has exhausted the rem-
edies available in the courts of the State”). 
 32 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1324. 
 33 Id.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (limiting federal habeas review to allegations 
of “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States”), (d)(1)–(2) (providing that federal court may grant habeas relief after state 
court adjudication only where state decision “was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts”). 
 34 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1324; Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Per-
son in Custody Pursuant to a State Court Judgment at 25, Patterson I, 812 F.3d 
885 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 836 F.3d 1358 
(11th Cir. 2016) (No. 12–12653–AA) (Supp. App. of Appellee, Ex. F). 
 35 Patterson v. McDonough, No. 4:06cv138–WS, 2007 WL 1577859, at *1 
(N.D. Fla. May 31, 2007); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
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mokalee, Florida, and undeterred by repeated losses in the court sys-
tem. He returned to state court and attacked the legality of his sen-
tence. Specifically, he challenged the punishment of chemical cas-
tration, moving pro se to correct an illegal sentence under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.36 Patterson argued that the trial 
court had failed to rest its order for chemical castration on the deter-
mination of a court-appointed medical expert, as it must under Flor-
ida statutory law.37 In addition, the court had failed to specify the 
duration of the treatment.38 This time, Patterson’s strategy worked. 
Both the state and the guardian ad litem for the victim stipulated 
to Patterson’s motion to vacate the punishment of chemical castra-
tion in light of his consecutive life sentences.39 The victim’s guard-
ian also sought to avoid unnecessary proceedings that would “ex-
pose the victim to the painful remembrance of the Defendant’s ac-
tions against her by having a contested hearing on an issue that is a 
‘moot point.’”40 Accordingly, on December 14, 2009, the circuit 
court judge granted Patterson’s motion and ordered that he “shall 
not have to undergo . . . ‘Chemical Castration’ as previously ordered 
by the Court at his sentencing in the above styled matter.”41 The or-
der ended there, with a finding that Patterson is currently serving life 
sentences but without an instruction regarding the components of 
his sentence that remained in force.42 
With this new state court order in hand, and now incarcerated in 
the Tomoka Correctional Institution in Daytona Beach, Florida, Pat-
terson returned to federal court.43 In 2011, he filed another pro se 
                                                                                                             
 36 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence at 1, State v. Patterson, No. 1997–171–
CF (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 2008); Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1324. 
 37 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, supra note 36, at 3–4. 
 38 Id. at 4. 
 39 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence at 2, State 
v. Patterson, No. 1997–171–CF (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 2009). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1–2. 
 43 See Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in Custody Pursuant to a 
State Court Judgment at 1, Patterson I, 812 F. 3d 885 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 836 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2016), No. 4:11–CV10–
RH–CAS (N.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Amended Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus]. 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.44 The 
petition again alleged that his 1998 convictions had violated his 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, this time 
including the Double Jeopardy Clause.45 The district court for the 
Northern District of Florida considered whether the new habeas pe-
tition was an unauthorized “second or successive” petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b), given that the court’s dismissal of Patterson’s 
prior petition as time-barred was an adjudication on the merits.46 
Without authorization from the court of appeals, the district court 
would lack jurisdiction to hear any “second or successive” peti-
tion.47 
As amended in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, section 2244(b)(1) provides that “[a] claim presented 
in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”48 
With exceptions not applicable here, section 2244(b)(2) requires 
dismissal even for claims “in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application” that were not previously presented.49 Yet, not all sec-
ond-in-time habeas petitions are unauthorized “second or succes-
sive” petitions.50 A new judgment from state court after Federal Pe-
tition #1 resets the habeas clock, inviting a future habeas petition 
directed to that intervening judgment to be a new Federal Petition 
#1.51 After all, the future petition is the first challenge to the inter-
vening judgment, which had not yet been issued at the time of the 
                                                                                                             
 44 Id.; see Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Order 
Granting Certificate of Appealability, supra note 10, at 2. 
 45 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1324; Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, 
supra note 10, at 2; Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 43, 
at 5–6. 
 46 Report and Recommendation to Deny § 2254 Petition at 5, Patterson v. 
Tucker, No. 4:11cv10–RH/CAS, 2012 WL 1365965 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2012) 
(adopted as district court opinion). 
 47 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 48 Id. § 2244(b)(1). 
 49 Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
 50 See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007) (“The Court has 
declined to interpret ‘second or successive’ as referring to all § 2254 applications 
filed second or successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-
court judgment already challenged in a prior § 2254 application.”). 
 51 Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see Mag-
wood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 341–42 (2010) (noting the “straightforward 
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prior petition.52 The Supreme Court put it plainly: to determine 
whether a second habeas petition is barred under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b), the “existence of a new judgment is dispositive.”53 
According to the district court, the “critical question” was 
whether Patterson was “in custody pursuant to a new sentence im-
posed in 2009.”54 The court’s answer: No. Section 2244(b) barred 
Patterson’s new habeas petition because the Florida court’s new or-
der did not constitute an intervening judgment that would break the 
succession of habeas petitions.55 Because the Florida order “merely 
invalidated a condition which had no impact on the prison sentence 
to be served,” Patterson was simply trying to “challenge[] his cus-
tody pursuant to the original sentence.”56 He already tried that once 
and failed with a late petition. He could not try a second time. 
Along with denying Patterson’s habeas petition, the district 
court also granted a certificate of appealability.57 Patterson then took 
his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Twice. 
 
II. PATTERSON OPINIONS 
The existence of a new state court judgment may be dispositive 
for counting federal habeas petitions. But identifying a new judg-
ment is no easy task. Both section 2244(b)(1) and section 2244(b)(2) 
expressly refer to habeas applications “under section 2254.”58 Sec-
tion 2254 contemplates “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus 
                                                                                                             
rule” that where “there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas 
petitions, an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not second or 
successive at all”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Insignares v. Sec’y, 
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding “that when 
a habeas petition is the first to challenge a new judgment, it is not ‘second or 
successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the sentence or the under-
lying conviction”). 
 52 Magwood, 561 U.S. at 339 (recognizing petitioner’s habeas application as 
the “first application challenging that intervening judgment”). 
 53 Id. at 324; cf. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (noting “there 
was no new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions”). 
 54 Report and Recommendation to Deny § 2254 Petition, supra note 46, at 6. 
 55 Id. at 8–9. 
 56 Id. at 9. 
 57 Patterson v. Tucker, No. 4:11cv10–RH/CAS, 2012 WL 1365965, at *2 
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2012). 
 58 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (2) (2012). 
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on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court.”59 A “judgment of a State court” comprises both conviction 
and sentence.60 Change either the conviction or the sentence, and a 
new judgment arises. 
In its two Patterson hearings, the Eleventh Circuit wrestled with 
how a criminal sentence must change to render a new “judgment of 
a State court.” A divided panel initially ruled in favor of Patterson, 
finding that his 2011 federal habeas petition was not “second or suc-
cessive” and, thus, should be heard on the merits.61 The division on 
the panel was even deeper than the 2-1 vote suggests. The concur-
ring opinion came from a federal district judge sitting by designa-
tion.62 Counting only active judges sitting on the Eleventh Circuit, 
the court divided evenly, one to one, on Patterson’s appeal. Judge 
Jordan wrote the majority opinion, with a concurring vote tipped in 
the petitioner’s favor, and Judge Pryor wrote the dissent. Upon re-
hearing en banc, those two judges took up their same argumentative 
mantles. Judge Pryor repeated paragraphs from his prior dissent to 
write the new majority opinion,63 and Judge Jordan quoted his va-
cated panel opinion to write the new dissent.64 This time around, 
Judge Pryor secured the one extra vote needed for the court’s opin-
ion, and Patterson lost by a vote of 6-5.65 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. § 2254(b)(1). 
 60 Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 
2014); see Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that “the judgment to which AEDPA refers is the underlying conviction 
and most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current detention”); Bur-
ton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (noting that petitioner’s “limitations pe-
riod did not begin until both his conviction and sentence became final”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 61 Patterson I, 812 F.3d 885, 894 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 836 F.3d 1358, 1358 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 62 See id. at 894–96 (Haikala, J., concurring and sitting by designation from 
the Northern District of Alabama). 
 63 Compare id. at 897–99, 904 (Pryor, J., dissenting), with Patterson II, 849 
F.3d 1321, 1323–25, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 64 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1329 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 1321–22 (majority opinion). One judge voting with the majority filed 
a concurring opinion and wrote separately only to clarify questions left unan-
swered. See id. at 1328 (Carnes, C.J., concurring) (“I fully concur in the well-
reasoned majority opinion . . . .”). 
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A. Custodial Change in Sentence 
The crux of Judge Pryor’s opinion, now elevated from dissent to 
majority, is that a sentencing change must be about custody to render 
a new state court judgment. 
To determine whether a state court has issued a new judgment 
intervening between federal habeas petitions, “[t]he judgment that 
matters for purposes of section 2244 is ‘the judgment authorizing 
the prisoner’s confinement.’”66 Section 2244 covers applications 
filed under section 2254. Quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), the Elev-
enth Circuit interpreted that statutory text to govern only petitions 
“that challenge ‘the judgment of a State court’ ‘pursuant to’ which 
the prisoner is ‘in custody.’”67 Not every change to a criminal sen-
tence resets the habeas clock, not even every material change.68 An 
increased or decreased imprisonment sentence likely would consti-
tute a new judgment, while a clerical correction likely would not.69 
The only relevant question is whether a state court order authorizes 
a prisoner’s confinement.70 If it does, then the order gives rise to a 
new judgment. If it does not, then there is no new judgment. 
In Patterson’s case, the Florida circuit court did not issue a new 
imprisonment sentence when granting his uncontested motion to va-
cate the punishment of chemical castration.71 Rather, the circuit 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. at 1325 (majority opinion) (quoting Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 
320, 332 (2010)); see id. (“the new judgment must be a judgment authorizing the 
prisoner’s confinement”) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. at 1326 (using 
“custody” and “confinement” interchangeably and noting that the need for two 
forms “to determine the scope of Patterson’s confinement does not transform the 
2009 order into a judgment that authorizes Patterson’s custody”). 
 67 Id. at 1325; see id. at 1323. 
 68 Id. at 1326 (stating that “our precedent . . . suggests that not all changes to 
a sentence create a new judgment” and that a limitation to material changes “still 
misses the point”); id. at 1327 (reiterating that “Patterson’s focus on the magni-
tude and type of change to the sentence is beside the point”). 
 69 Id. at 1326 (distinguishing the facts of Patterson from the facts of In-
signares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(where the state court had corrected a sentence by reducing mandatory-minimum 
imprisonment sentence from twenty years to ten years, but retained a twenty-
seven year imprisonment sentence), and noting that “when a court corrects a cler-
ical mistake, no new judgment arises” for FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A)). 
 70 Id. at 1326–27. 
 71 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, supra 
note 39. 
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court’s “1998 judgment remains the only order that commands the 
Secretary to imprison Patterson.”72 Thus, “because Patterson is not 
‘in custody pursuant to’ the consent order that he not undergo chem-
ical castration, that order does not trigger a new round of federal 
collateral review.”73 Patterson had his chance. He’s done. The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the petition.74 
B. Substantive Change in Sentence 
The crux of Judge Jordan’s opinion, now downgraded from ma-
jority to dissent, is that a sentencing change must be substantively 
different to render a new state court judgment. 
A criminal sentence plays a “critical role” in a judgment, and 
chemical castration is one punishment a defendant may face.75 An 
order vacating that punishment “substantively changes the way that 
the Department of Corrections can execute the initial judgment.”76 
Rather than giving “primacy to custody” as in the majority opinion, 
the dissent looked to the nature of the sentencing change: chemical 
castration is a “substantive punishment,” and the “new sentence . . . 
is substantively different than the original sentence.”77 The dissent 
agreed that a clerical correction would not create a new judgment, 
but not because such correction is irrelevant to confinement.78 Ra-
ther, a typo is trivial: “there is no way anyone can say” that a chem-
ical castration order “is in any way clerical.”79 
Here, the Florida court’s vacatur order “affects and modifies Mr. 
Patterson’s initial sentence.”80 Thus, the court “impose[d] a new 
sentence” on the prisoner, called a respectful “Mr. Patterson” by the 
                                                                                                             
 72 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1327. 
 73 Id. at 1323. 
 74 Id. at 1328. 
 75 Id. at 1330. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1332 (both emphases added); see id. at 1329 (quoting Patterson I 
majority opinion that described state court order as “substantively vacating a por-
tion of the sentence but leaving Mr. Patterson’s remaining convictions and total 
custodial sentences intact”) (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. at 1332. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1331. 
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dissent alone.81 A new sentence gives rise to a new judgment, and a 
new judgment in state court gives rise to a new habeas opportunity 
in federal court.82 Mr. Patterson’s case deserves further review. Of 
course, now he won’t get it. 
 
III. TEXTUAL AND SUBTEXTUAL DISPUTES 
With all votes counted, the Eleventh Circuit has codified a nar-
row view of state court judgments for purposes of federal habeas 
review. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Patterson II 
have merit and enough appeal to divide the court. But there is no 
textual basis to prefer one opinion over the over. Although the ma-
jority stresses fidelity to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), in fact 
it takes grammatical liberties. Underlying the language, the core is-
sue is subtextual. The judges’ point of dispute—custody or sub-
stance—is a proxy for a deeper and older point of dispute in criminal 
law—finality or justice. 
The majority opinion in Patterson II has the passing appearance 
of superiority because it closely tracks the text of section 2244(b). 
Specifically, the majority analyzes the reference to section 2254, 
while the dissent does not. Relying on its textual analysis, the ma-
jority presents its conclusion as “follow[ing] from the text of the 
statute.”83 Section 2244(b) requires dismissal of “[a] claim pre-
sented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under 
section 2254.”84 Section 2254(b) describes applications “on behalf 
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”85 
According to the majority, combining these two statutes makes clear 
that the only relevant judgment from state court “is the judgment 
‘pursuant to’ which the prisoner is ‘in custody.’”86 The conclusion, 
                                                                                                             
 81 Id. Compare id. at 1322–28 (majority opinion), with id. at 1329–33 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting). 
 82 Id. at 1325 (majority opinion). 
 83 Id. 
 84 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 86 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1326. 
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then, focuses squarely on custody. The prohibition on second or suc-
cessive habeas petitions bars a prisoner from repeatedly “contesting 
the judgment authorizing his confinement.”87 
However, the statutory text is not so easily grafted onto the ma-
jority opinion, and the custody conclusion not so direct. Section 
2254(b) provides, more fully, that “[a]n application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that” cer-
tain conditions hold.88 Notice the main point of the sentence: An 
application shall not be granted unless . . . . Notice, in particular, the 
grammar: “on behalf of” introduces a prepositional phrase with the 
noun “person” as its object: “on behalf of a person.” The noun “per-
son” is also modified by a prepositional phrase: “in custody.” The 
noun “custody” is then modified: “pursuant to the judgment.” So, 
too, the noun “judgment”: “of a State court.” Each prepositional 
phrase conveys a relation as it modifies the prior noun.89 All to-
gether, the phrases specify the “application” at the heart of the sen-
tence: one seeking habeas corpus relief, and one filed on behalf of a 
certain type of person. Section 2254 governs habeas applications 
filed only on behalf of a person who is in custody, and only in the 
type of custody that comes from a state court judgment.  
In its opinion, the majority extracts “a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court” and rearranges the words: “sec-
tion 2254 governs petitions that challenge ‘the judgment of a State 
court’ ‘pursuant to’ which the prisoner is ‘in custody.’”90 Yet, the 
statute contains prepositional phrases stacked like nesting dolls, one 
                                                                                                             
 87 Id. at 1325; see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83 (2005) (habeas 
“seeks invalidation (in whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s 
confinement”); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010) (quoting Wil-
kinson, 544 U.S. at 83). 
 88 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 
 89 See ANNE ENQUIST, LAUREL CURRIE OATES & JEREMY FRANCIS, JUST 
WRITING 162–63 (5th ed. 2017); RANDOLF QUIRK ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE 
GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 657 (1985). 
 90 Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1325; see id. at 1323 (“Patterson is not ‘in custody 
pursuant to,’ § 2254(b)(1), the consent order . . . .”), 1324 (“Patterson was ‘not in 
custody pursuant to’ the 2009 order.”), 1326 (“[T]he only judgment that counts 
for purposes of section 2244 is the judgment ‘pursuant to’ which the prisoner is 
‘in custody.’”). 
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after the other. The order matters. A sentence is composed as a se-
mantic structure, such that its word order influences its meaning.91 
Changing the order risks changing the meaning. The sentence “John 
amuses Amy” is not accurately quoted as “Amy amuses John,” even 
though the component words are identical.92 Similarly, “a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” is not accurately 
quoted as “the judgment of a State court pursuant to which a person 
is in custody.” Section 2254 refers to “state court” only to modify 
“judgment,” refers to “judgment” only to modify “custody,” refers 
to “custody” only to modify “person,” and refers to “person” only 
to modify the subject, “application.” On its face, section 2254 gov-
erns petitions filed by a certain type of person who is in a certain 
type of custody. 
This interpretation finds support not only in the plain language 
of the statute and linguistic principles, but also in companion provi-
sions and legislative history. First, as a threshold matter, subsection 
2254(b) should not be read in isolation. The title of section 2254 is 
“State custody; remedies in Federal courts.”93 This title situates the 
entire section in the context of state custody. Although statutory ti-
tles and headings cannot limit or displace the operative text, they 
“are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning 
of a statute.”94 Second, in 1996, as part of its habeas corpus reforms 
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Congress 
added a one-year statute of limitations to habeas filings, specifying 
                                                                                                             
 91 See Kathrin Glüer, Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions, in 
CONTINUUM COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 84, 86 (Manuel 
García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel eds., 2012) (“Sentences have a constituent 
structure; they are composed of ‘smaller’ parts, and their meaning seems to de-
pend, in a systematic manner, on the parts they are built of, and the way in which 
these parts are put together.”). 
 92 See id. at 100 n.6 (“That the way in which the parts of a sentence are put 
together, i.e. its syntactic mode of composition, plays a role here can be seen from 
examples such as ‘Bob kicks Mary’ and ‘Mary kicks Bob’. These sentences are 
composed of the same parts, but differ in meaning. The difference depends on 
which syntactic role the parts play.”). 
 93 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (entitled “State custody; remedies in 
Federal courts”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) (entitled “Federal custody; reme-
dies on motion attacking sentence”). 
 94 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (internal 
quotation omitted); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 
33, 47 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). 
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those filings by use of a similar prepositional phrase: the limitations 
period applies “to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”95 As in 
section 2254, “judgment” is relevant as a modifier for “custody,” 
which modifies “person,” which in turn modifies “application.” Fi-
nally, in 1966, when Congress previously amended the habeas cor-
pus statute, the House Committee on the Judiciary described the bar 
against successive petitions as applying “when a person, in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of a State court, has been denied . . . release 
from custody.”96 Even three decades before the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, Congress was already focused on the 
person filing the petition rather than the judgment challenged in the 
petition. It is an interpretive stretch to switch the focus to judgment 
and conclude, as the majority does, that the text governs only those 
petitions directed to a judgment authorizing confinement. 
From a textual perspective, the dispute between the majority and 
dissenting opinions ends in a toss-up. Only the majority pays atten-
tion to section 2244(b)’s reference to section 2254, but it engages in 
grammatical acrobatics to reach a conclusion that does not naturally 
flow from the text. Looking beneath the text, it is not surprising that 
the dispute between the majority and dissenting opinions in Patter-
son II defies easy resolution. The majority opinion gives precise, but 
narrow, guidance for interpreting state court judgments: Does the 
new judgment authorize the prisoner’s custody? The dissenting 
opinion gives imprecise, but expansive, guidance for interpreting 
state court judgments: Is the new judgment substantively different? 
Each view reflects a different value judgment. For the majority, pro-
hibiting second or successive habeas petitions respects finality, as a 
benefit to the victim, by keeping a past trauma firmly in the past, 
and to society, by deterring and rehabilitating offenders with swift 
sanctions.97 For the dissent, prohibiting second or successive habeas 
                                                                                                             
 95 H.R. REP. NO. 104–518, at 4 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
 96 H.R. REP. NO. 89–1892, at 7–8 (1966) (Conf. Rep.); see id. at 3 (noting that 
House bill “revises the procedures applicable to the review by lower [f]ederal 
courts of petitions for habeas corpus by prisoners who have been convicted and 
who are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”) (emphasis added). 
 97 Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
1190 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1175 
 
petitions respects justice, as state courts may impose criminal sen-
tences as they see fit and federal courts may review any significant 
sentencing changes.98 Indeed, federal oversight of state convictions 
as a tool for justice extends back to the Reconstruction Era, when 
Congress sought “to deal severely with the States of the former Con-
federacy.”99 
The dispute among the judges in Patterson II lays bare a deep 
and enduring dispute in criminal law between finality and justice.100 
Modern habeas corpus law promotes both concerns. Congress has 
tried to alleviate the burden on federal courts “by introducing a 
greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceed-
ings” while at the same time recognizing that the “writ of habeas 
corpus is one of the most important safeguards of individual lib-
erty.”101 In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Con-
gress “wished to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, 
and to give effect to state convictions.”102 This legislative wish must 
                                                                                                             
 98 Id. at 1331 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (noting that “Florida law does not re-
quire that a criminal judgment be in writing” and that “AEDPA—in both text and 
spirit—is meant to respect the way that states administer their criminal justice 
systems”); see Oral Argument at 37:50, Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 
2017) (No. 12-12653) (“Member of the Court: Castration is a pretty significant 
part of a sentence, you would agree with me. But your argument is that, it doesn’t 
matter how significant the judgment is—got to be a new piece of paper, in Flor-
ida? Counsel for the State: It’s got to be a new piece of paper to hold him in 
confinement.”). 
 99 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–88 (1977); see The Habeas Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 
ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see also Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil & Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 26 
(1995) (statement of Rubin Carter) (describing federal courts as extending a hand 
of friendship to “those as the bottom of the empowerment pile”). 
 100 See McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1281, 1282 (1991) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting from denial of stay of execution) (admonishing Court for denying consti-
tutional protections to death penalty defendants and, “in essence, valu[ing] finality 
over justice”); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 359 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in judgment) (“That the Court permitted [petitioner in McCleskey] to be 
executed without ever hearing the merits of his claims starkly reveals the Court’s 
skewed value system, in which finality of judgments, conservation of state re-
sources, and expediency of executions seem to receive greater solicitude than jus-
tice and human life.”). 
 101 H.R. REP. NO. 89–1797, at 2 (1966); H.R. REP. NO. 89–1892, at 4 (1966). 
 102 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000); see H.R. REP. NO. 104–518, 
at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (designing “reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory 
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contend with the original purpose of habeas corpus: to fulfill the 
promise of the Magna Carta “that no man would be imprisoned con-
trary to the law of the land.”103 As codified in the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679, the writ governed all prisoners “committed or detained 
. . . for any [c]rime”—even violent crimes against children.104 
With its ancient pedigree and revered status as the Great Writ, 
habeas corpus is a flash point for the competing concerns of finality 
and justice.105 The tension between these concerns arises in other 
areas of criminal law, as well, including constitutional provisions 
that Patterson himself invoked in his many court filings.106 For ex-
ample, in 1824, Justice Story articulated a “manifest necessity” ex-
ception to the double jeopardy bar against a second trial.107 That 
nineteenth-century case involved a mistrial after the jury was unable 
                                                                                                             
writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and 
abuse in capital cases”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (“[W]e 
hold the general rule to be that, where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls 
its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief 
to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscar-
riage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence. The rule accom-
modates the need to allow courts to remedy actual injustice while recognizing 
that, at some point, the State must be allowed to exercise its ‘sovereign power to 
punish offenders.’”) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)). 
 103 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008). 
 104 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 §§ 3, 7 (Eng.) (requiring re-
lease upon certain sureties for crimes other than “Treason or Fellony plainely and 
specially expressed in the Warrant of Commitment” and requiring prompt crimi-
nal proceedings for treason or felonies); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recounting history of habeas corpus). 
 105 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807) (“[W]hen we say the writ 
of habeas corpus, without addition, we most generally mean that great writ which 
is now applied for; and in that sense it is used in the constitution.”). Compare 
Zant, 499 U.S. at 491 (“Finality has special importance in the context of a federal 
attack on a state conviction.”), with Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1337 
(11th Cir. 2011) (Hill, J., dissenting) (“Finality with justice is achieved only when 
the imprisoned has had a meaningful opportunity for a reliable judicial determi-
nation of his claim.”). 
 106 See Patterson II, 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 107 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 579–80 (1824) (stating that, in the 
event of a hung jury, “the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to 
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the 
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the 
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”). 
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to reach a verdict, and to this day a hung jury remains the gold stand-
ard for manifest necessity.108 The manifest necessity exception pur-
sues justice over finality, a debatable balance of values.109 The ma-
jority opinion in Patterson II pursues finality at the cost of justice; 
the dissenting opinion pursues justice at the cost of finality. As ex-
pressive of core value judgments, the divide on the bench over “sec-
ond or successive” habeas corpus petitions will remain. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the federal statute does not determine whether a par-
ticular habeas corpus petition is “second or successive.” Because 
there is no basis in statutory language to prefer one opinion over the 
over, judges choose the view that reflects their values. Patterson I 
set a bar of substantive change, promoting justice. Patterson II set a 
bar of custodial change, promoting finality. Both views have merit. 
The same facts and law came up twice before the Eleventh Circuit. 
When the audience changed, the outcome changed. As federal law 
evolves toward a more narrow view of state court judgments, the 
habeas lottery will be more often lost than won. 
                                                                                                             
 108 Id.; see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (“While other situ-
ations have been recognized by our cases as meeting the ‘manifest necessity’ 
standard, the hung jury remains the prototypical example.”). 
 109 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 169 (1873) (“The common law not only 
prohibited a second punishment for the same offence, but it went further and for-
bid a second trial for the same offence, whether the accused had suffered punish-
ment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted.”); 
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (recognizing that “a defendant’s valued 
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances 
be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judg-
ments”); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978) (“[T]he courts have 
held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require 
the defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society’s 
interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who 
have violated its laws.”); see also David O. Markus, Should There Be a Retrial in 
Cosby?, SDFLA BLOG (June 19, 2017), http://sdfla.blog-
spot.com/2017/06/should-there-be-retrial-in-cosby.html (“[P]erhaps it is time to 
revisit this issue as citizens should simply not be forced to fight the Government 
more than once on the same facts . . . .”). 
